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Rhode Island's Judicial Merit
Selection Process Merits Improvement
Alan S. Flink*
I want to thank Professor Yelnosky and the Roger Williams
University School of Law for holding this Symposium. As
mentioned by Dean Logan, when the law school was created over
fifteen years ago, one of its hoped-for attributes was to provide a
forum for seminars of this kind. Indeed, it was the intention of
the founders for the law school to add its voice to the discussion
and debate of significant legal matters presented in Rhode Island.
The State greatly needs this input and it is very commendable
that we are having this Symposium today.
This Symposium allows those of us who are interested in
judicial reform to pull various issues together in the hope of
revitalizing the system that was contemplated when the
Constitution was amended in 1994. I bring a slightly different
perspective because I have been involved in the merit selection
process for about as long as anyone still active in the cause -
about twenty-five years. This is a good ten years before the
judicial merit selection law was adopted in 1994. Initially, I was
involved with the Rhode Island Bar Association, which recognized
a need for legal reform even before the various scandals of the
1980s and 1990s occurred. We recognized that judges should be
selected on the basis of merit in order to ensure that cases would
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be heard by a nonpartisan and independent judiciary and thereby
earn the trust and support of all citizens.
There were several Governors in the 1970s and 1980s who,
pursuant to the advice of the Bar Association, adopted various
screening procedures by executive orders. During that time, the
Governor would send a list of attorneys to a Bar Association
Committee that reviewed the candidates, graded them and
submitted a report to the Governor for consideration. Sometimes
the Committee's recommendations were followed, sometimes not.
The Bar was not satisfied with this ad hoc system, but
nevertheless accepted it for a time as being preferable to the
existing manner of selecting judges-a system which appeared to
make political connections the primary attribute in the choice
process.
The preliminary catalyst for change came once the various
judicial scandals occurred in the 1980s. Consequently, during the
1986 Constitutional Convention, an amendment was proposed
that provided for the merit selection of judges, among other
judicial reforms. The amendment was rejected in large measure
for the reason that the Grand Committee's role in electing
Supreme Court justices was to be retained.1
Under the system in place, judicial scandals continued to
occur and the developing crisis was exacerbated by the Rhode
Island RISDIC banking crisis. Voters were disenchanted with
government as a whole. Those of us who had been in the reform
movement knew that a crisis situation frequently gives rise to
reform opportunities, and action was taken accordingly. The
RIght Now Coalition, a broad-based community organization
spearheaded by Common Cause and consisting of a variety of
disparate community groups, including the Bar Association, was
organized and soon became the moving party in seeking to change
the existing method of selecting judges to one based on merit. The
Bar Association and Common Cause were the primary negotiators
in preparing various merit selection plans in consultation with the
American Judicature Society, the preeminent national
organization on the judicial merit selection process. Initially, the
1. The Grand Committee consisted of the House and Senate as one body
which voted on the judicial candidates for the Supreme Court. Candidates
submitted their names to the Grand Committee for consideration.
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General Assembly was not agreeable to change, particularly a
change that would weaken its hold on the judicial selection
process. Negotiating the various proposals with the leaders of the
General Assembly was very difficult and ultimately resulted in
serious flaws in the system adopted, which I will enumerate later.
Those of us who have resided in Rhode Island most of our
lives know that traditionally the legislature has been the de facto
governing body in Rhode Island. Our Constitution provided for a
relatively weak Governor. As a result, the legislature was
formerly instrumental in selecting judges and making other key
governmental decisions. Given the power vested in the General
Assembly at that time, negotiations on the issue of merit selection
were complicated. In particular, one of the most difficult issues
involved the selection of Supreme Court justices, which were
formerly elected by the Grand Committee. At that time, the
Governor was not involved. As in most, if not all states, the House
has far more members than the Senate. So, practically, the House
controlled the selection of Supreme Court justices. Given that the
Speaker is the most powerful position in the House, he wielded
tremendous power in the process of selecting Supreme Court
justices.
The judicial machinations that occurred in the 1980s and
1990s demonstrated what can happen under such a system. The
Speaker himself became the Chief Justice in 1976.2 His successor,
promoted by the then Speaker, was appointed to become the
Court's Chief Clerk.3 Scandals arose in both instances. 4 Merit,
obviously, was not a major consideration in either of the cited
instances. It turned out that Rhode Island was one of only three
states to select their Supreme Court justices in this manner. We
thought we could and should do better. But the House was not
ready to give up. Indeed, House leaders insisted upon
maintaining its involvement in the process by requiring its advice
and consent together with that of the Senate when Supreme Court
justices were appointed. Some of us objected to dual confirmation,
but the House was unbending; it took the position that refusal to
2. See Common Cause Rhode Island, Judicial Reform: Background and
History, http://www.commoncauseri.org/wordpress/?page-id=54 (last visited
May 12, 2006).
3. See id.
4. See id.
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include the House was a deal-breaker. Therefore, RIght Now
compromised and the measure of the compromise came quickly.
Shortly after the Merit Selection Constitutional Amendment was
passed, the House underscored its continued participation in the
selection of Supreme Court justices by arbitrarily rejecting the
appointment of a very qualified female attorney.
The second major stumbling block was the composition of the
Judicial Nominating Commission ("JNC"). RIght Now proposed
that the majority of the members should be selected by the
Governor, since she/he had the final authority to make and be
ultimately accountable for judicial appointments. Conversely, it
was felt by some that the balance of the members should be
selected by the Bar Association since members of the Bar 5 and
their clients together comprised the public interest group most
directly affected by a judicial merit selection system. Legislation
was required to implement the Constitutional Amendment. Once
again the General Assembly (both Houses) insisted they be
directly involved in the selection of JNC members. As a result,
another compromise was made and the proposed appointments by
the Bar Association became the appointments of the majority and
minority leadership of the General Assembly.
Looking back at it now, I say without any reservation, those
two compromises led to an ill-conceived merit selection system.
The leadership of the General Assembly has, from the inception,
consistently failed to comply with the law and replace their
appointees at the end of their terms leading to holdovers,
tantamount to reappointments, which were prohibited by the law.
Consequently, this resulted in a failure to maintain a rotating
Commission expressly required by the law. The foregoing gives
rise to the perception that the JNC is not operating in a
nonpartisan and independent manner as required by the law and
the main purpose for the adoption of the merit selection plan in
the first place. If the merit selection system does not work as
intended, it does not mean we do not have competent and
qualified judges. Rather, it means that the system designed to
instill confidence in the citizens of Rhode Island - that their
judiciary was selected in a nonpartisan and independent manner
5. All Rhode Island attorneys are required to belong to the Bar
Association.
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based solely on merit - has not materialized as hoped for.
The proof of the pudding, if one is looking for proof, is the fact
that the number of judicial applicants has diminished over the
years, creating the impression that "political sponsorship" is a
prerequisite for an applicant to have a meaningful opportunity to
be on the JNC's list submitted to the Governor. The relations
most applicants have with various political bodies, as office-
holders or as employees of state or municipal entities, furthers
that impression. It appears that applicants who do not enjoy some
kind of political relationship are in short supply. That is the way
it was prior to merit selection, and unfortunately many of us
believe the selection system has not materially changed. Recently,
for a vacancy in the Superior Court, there were seven applicants,
six of whom were either members of the Attorney General's
department or had some connection with politics. Rachel
Caufield, one of the speakers and a recognized authority on
judicial merit selection, pointed out (and many now agree) that if
we do not know who has applied to the JNC, the public has no
idea who has or has not been considered. Full disclosure would
allow a comparison among the applicant pool to help determine
whether there is validity to the required political sponsorship
accusation. It is therefore recommended that the JNC consider
disclosing the names of all applicants, not just those who are
interviewed.
In conclusion, the merit selection process should be reviewed
for the primary purpose of eliminating involvement of the General
Assembly in the process, with the exception of confirmation of
appointments by the Senate. We are led to believe that in no
other State where merit selection has been adopted does the
legislature play such an active role as it does in Rhode Island.6
The House must be eliminated from the Supreme Court advice
and consent process.7 Further, the appointees to the JNC should
be made by the Governor and some person(s) or body other than
members of the General Assembly, preferably the Bar Association.
6. The General Assembly should confine itself to its constitutionally
designated duties - legislating; it should not be involved in the judicial
selection process other than the traditional role of the Senate to give its
advice and consent to judicial appointees.
7. Traditionally, in our system of governance the role of giving advice
and consent to executive appointments is confined to the Senate only.
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I realize these two suggestions are tall orders, but they are at the
heart of making the judicial merit selection system work as
intended. There is one more important suggestion. As I have
said, the Rhode Island Bar Association was one of the propelling
forces for the initiation and acceptance of a merit selection system.
It should become a player again. The Bar and its clients should
have the most interest in a merit-based judicial selection process;
and the members of the Bar have collectively the most knowledge
about the lawyers most deserving to be elevated to the various
courts in Rhode Island. Involvement by the Rhode Island Bar
Association is therefore essential if the judicial selection process is
to operate as the voters intended when the Constitution was
amended.
